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INTRODUCTION
If we are to believe Holzkamp's autobiographical notes
(Holzkamp, 1972, p. 207 f.f.), his first confrontation with
a critical approach to traditional scientific study consisted
of his dispute with a psychology-student — Irmgard Staeuble
— about her Masters thesis. This was in 1964. This thesis was
concerned with a problem in the area of research into biases
and was written from the view-point of the critical theory
of the « Frankfurt School» (see Jay, 1976). It was the repre-
sentatives of this school — Adorno and Habermas — who
had begun to challenge the representatives of the traditional
'positivistic' scientific theory, namely Popper and Albert (see
Adorno, 1978).
These discussions about the foundations of traditional scienti-
fic study primarily restricted to sociology, were to go down in
history äs the « positivistic conflict» or the « third methodo-
logy conflict»! Two important themes in this debate concern
the problem of research into the interrelation between indivi-
dual phenomena and the problem of values in scientific
research.
With respect to the first theme, there was the question of
the possibility and necessity of the « pretence of totality »,
a notion held on to particularly in (neo-) marxist circles. Does
scientific study consist of a series of detailed studies from
which insight into historical and social interrelations emerges,
äs it were, by chance? Or should one's attention in each detai-
led study remain focused upon the historical and social context
in which the section of study being examined is situated, so
that the development of a meaningful overall view might be
ensured?
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The theme of values concerned the question of die role of
science in determining the goals for which scientific knowledge
should be employed. In the positivistic ranks, the position of
value-free science was defended, in particular with references
to the « naturalistic f allacy » (Hume). Science is only capable
of saying something meaningful äs what is; what ought to be,
however, could never be logically or responsibly deduced
from purely factual premises. Science should refrain from
Statements about the desirability of particular norms, values
and goals. Alternatively, the critical camp pointed to the
inevitability of supporting or opposing certain goals for which
knowledge is employed. And because of this inevitability, it
seemed preferrable that science should responsibly, that is ratio-
nally consider these goals, rather than cling to a semblance
of neutrality.
Staeuble confronted her advisor with the necessity of also
conducting this discussion among psychologists. From his
positivistic view, Holzkamp had initially made a good number
of critical notes with respect to the thesis mentioned above.
But in the course of the discussion he more and more inclined
to the view that psychology should not be allowed to miss
the criticism of the 'Frankfurt School'. It did, indeed, appear
that psychological research restricted itself to miniscule sec-
tions of study which were observed under very artificial
experimental circumstances.
To the extent that it was verified according to the then
current methodological criteria, psychological knowledge was
fragmented knowledge. The all-embracing theories of classical
psychologists, such äs Freud, had fallen from grace long before,
at least from the point of view of the dominating « positi-
vistic » thinkers. The clinical view of the totality had in
general made way for a scientifically orientated analytical
approach from detail. Alternatively, the question arose, par-
ticularly in post-war Germany, äs to what extent psychology
had surrendered itself, by virtue of its demands of a value-free
science, to the dominant values and norms. Worse still,
were these not the values and norms of «coincidental»
dominant groups in society? In Germany, recent history had
clearly demonstrated that a system of values can become
totally perverted when science, äs in the 'positivistic' con-
ception, functions uncritically. The idea of value-free science
was therefore difficult to seil. Critical students in particular
raised the question, whether psychology should not protect
itself from such catastrophic instances of 'value-breakdown'.
Should it not take the initiative and determine in a more
rational way which values and norms should guide scientific
research and the application of scientific knowledge?
At the time Holzkamp was confronted with this sort of
questions, he could not have conceived that 15 years later
people would speak of Critical Psychology äs an influential
« school » with a clearly recognizable identity. The first inter-
national congress, held in Marburg in 1977, drew more than
3000 participants, from both within Germany and abroad.
A clearer Illustration of the resonance of a movement with a
relatively short history is hardly imaginable. This school,
which Holzkamp preferred not to consider a separate psycho-
logical school but a necessary addition to traditional psycho-
logy, was to move away from the original source of inspiration
— the critical theory of the Frankfurt School — and return
in particular to the more orthodox Marxist Soviet psychological
'Cultural Historical School' of Vygotsky, Luria, Leontiev
and others.
From the very beginning, critical psychology was a phe-
nomenon to be found only in Berlin. Though many people
outside Berlin and even outside the German Federal Re-
public were responsive to the results of this school, the
developers of critical psychological theory have nearly all
worked at the Psychological Institute of the Free University
in Berlin (Holzkamp, 1978). Some go even farther and defend
the proposition that Critical Psychology has become a kind
of family enterprise and might better be called the « Holzkamp
School » (Geuter, 1977, Huber, 1977). The personality cult
such a name implies, and which is unmistakably present in
the work of Holzkamp's « pupils », does not appear to be
entirely unfounded. One could in fact defend the proposition
that without the personality of Holzkamp (historical materia-
listic) criticism of psychology would have arisen but not
Critical Psychology. Holzkamp was the very person to de-
velop detailed, and for many people convincing, immanent
criticism of aspects of then current psychology, from his
intensive practical experience with traditional psychological re-
search and from his original identification with a variant
within the 'positivistic' scientific theory, constructivism (Holz-
kamp, 1968).
He wrote this criticism in five articles, published in the
period 1968-1970, and republished in the collection 'Critical
Psychology', in which they were provided with a critical
introduction. This collection was rightly subtitled « Vorbereiten-
de Arbeiten » (Preliminary Work] äs it resulted in an attempt,
briefly discussed and with little foundation, at an alternati-
ve approach to psychological questions. Emphasis was still
laid entirely upon reconstruction and criticism of then current
scientific study. For example, he criticized the lack of social
relevance in most psychological research results and exposed
the « organismic » image of man behind the current experi-
mental practices. In addition, he further developed his con-
structivistic variant of a positivistic scientific theory, following
here Dingler's example, in order to find the necessary areas
for immanent criticism. Finally, in a seif-critical, nearly auto-
biographical final paragraph, he somewhat abruptly embraces
the historical materialistic theory, which will definitively cor-
rect all the shortcomings of traditional psychology äs a sort
of 'deus ex machina'. For example, the Solutions to the pro-
blems of relevance and values would be implied in the results
of research of good quality: in other words, the scientific
nature of research results themselves would guarantee a high
level of social and ethical relevance, independent of the subjec-
tive choices of the individual researcher or of the specific area
of research. Alternative research strategies were, however,
hardly developed. In the future Holzkamp and his collaborators
would try to realize these programmatic wishes and expecta-
tions.
At the start of the seventies, Holzkamp had a unique
opportunity to create the conditions, also in the areas of
organization and personnel, under which Critical Psychology
could be developed into a school with its own research
program. After he had made the necessary theoretical prepa-
rations for such a development, a schism, partially brought
about by students, developed at the Institute at which he was
a professor. The departure of a number of more conservative
assistants and professors led to a Situation in which Holzkamp,
äs the only remaining professor, together with the remaining
assistants and predominantly « critical» students had to fill
12 vacancies for research assistants, 5 vacancies for assistant
professors and 4 vacancies for professors (Holzkamp, 1972,
p. 269, cf. Mattes, 1979). In fact, an Institute for « Critical
Psychology » with more than 500 students and more than 70
staff had developed having to make a completely new Start
in the areas of teaching, research and administration. In this
Situation both the work and personality o£ Holzkamp were
a welcome orientation point and formed the binding element
in the years of development that followed.
Now that we have given a broad outline of the origin and
development of Critical Psychology, we would like to devote
particular attention in the following paragraphs to the metho-
dological aspects of this school. Due to its often devastating
criticism of current psychological research, it has taken on
the responsibility of proving that an alternative 'critical me-
thodology' is indeed possible. This does not mean, of course,
that we can completely ignore the critical remarks Critical
Psychology had made concerning the various methods of psycho-
logical research (see also Van Ijzendoorn, van der Veer,
Goossens, 1981).
The contributions of Critical Psychology in the area of
perceptual, motivational and cognitive theory will only be
dealt with in passing, if at all. As a result, an important part
of the writings will not receive any of our attention. We
believe, however, that we must restrict ourselves äs a respon-
sible evaluation of the contributions would require a more
specialized knowledge of these areas themselves.
THE FUNCTIONAL-HISTORICAL METHOD AND TRADITIONAL
HEURISTICS
In Popper's critical rationalism a sharp distinction is made
between the context of discovery of a new System of concepts,
a new theory or a new hypothesis and the context of justifica-
tion of propositions. In the first context, Intuition and creati-
vity may be used freely in formulating bold speculations which
later are subjected to strict tests through the falsification
principle. From where a scientist gets bis ideas and theories
is no business of a methodology directed toward justifying
propositions with a pretention to truth. To Popper, heuristics,
that is finding hypotheses for research, is an area that should
be studied by psychologists instead of methodologists. The
only decisive test for the truth of a proposition is the dedu-
ction of an observable prediction and its confrontation with
observations. If the predicted Situation does not occur, we
speak of definite falsification (refutation) of the proposition 1.
The origin of the Statement is of no consequence at all, äs
this implies an inductive process that can never be strictly logi-
cally described. Indeed, Popper did not develop a « logic of
scientific discovery », äs was the English title of his most
important book, but a « logic of scientific justification ». To
Popper there is no logic involved in the context of discovery
(see Simon, 1973).
When Holzkamp views the current state of psychology, he
concludes that this social science must have followed Pop-
per's recipe most literally. In no other discipline do so many
uncoordinated, audacious conjectures appear to have been
made in creating hypotheses and ad-hoc theories than in
psychology! And these «bore» in fact a hodge-podge of
facts which fundamental theoretical developments did not keep
up to. Instead of the Integration of available facts into one
general theoretical perspective from which hypotheses could
systematically be deduced, a jungle of occasional theories and
hypotheses developed.
Poppers dictum that the weeds of incorrect propositions
would be uprooted by falsifications proved to have fatal conse-
quences in practice. The unbridled fantasy and creativity of
many a psychological researcher led all too often to tinkering
at detail questions which were neither theoretically nor socially
relevant.
Heuristics within the positivistic tradition
It is of course true that within the positivistic tradition
1 We will not expand on the logical problems involved with the falsification
principle. The Duhem-Quine thesis in particular makes clear that the deduction
of an empirical Statement e from an individual hypothesis h usually involves
a series of medial constructions and background knowledge a, which makes
the falsification of h alone logically impossible:
h Λ a H- e
—i e
-H(h Λ a)
Holzkamp's 'Exhaustion' principle is based on this state of affairs: a hypothesis
that has apparently been falsified on the basis of results of observation can
always be salvaged by reverting to errors in background knowledge or in the
medial contructions (Diederick in Braun/Radermacher, 1978, p. 634 f.f.).
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attempts have been made to develop a theory or logic (Simon,
1973, 1977, 1979) concerning the context of discovery.
Simon in particular tried to show that it is possible (and with
a view to efficiency necessary) to formulate a «logic» of
generating hypotheses in die form of consistent Statements.
However, he Starts with the principle that the discovery
process consists of the recoding, economically and within
models, of a collection of empirical data.
Assuming for example the letter sequence:
ABMCDMEFMGHMIJMKLMMNM...
it is then possible to distill more or less systematically a pattern
summing up economically and concisely this closed collection
of data (the alphabet must be seen äs a circle in which Z
follows A). The letter sequence is a sequence of triads. M
always appears äs the last letter of the triad. The pattern can
be described äs follows:
n(a)n(a)s(ß); a=Z, ß=M
in which n (a), is the replacement of a letter with the letter
that follows in the alphabet, and s (ß) is the repetition of the
same letter that β Stands for.
How can such a pattern be discovered? Simon believes there
are two more or less systematic strategies possible: the « Bri-
tish Museum Algorithm » and the « Heuristic Search Algo-
rithm ». Assuming that the « hypothesis generating machine »
is capable of working with the relationship of identity (same = s)
and sequence (next=n), then the former strategy consists of
describing in great detail every possible combination of the two
relations. The machine could produce the following variants:
s(a), n(a), s(cc)s(ß), n(oc)n(ß), s(a)n(a), s(a)n(ß) etc.
The pattern n(a)n(a)s(ß) would then appear automatically.
Of course, with a somewhat more complicated pattern, this
is a very cumbersome strategy. More efficient is the Heu-
ristic Search Algorithm, which searches less systematically for
explicit regularities in the letter sequences. The entire sequence
is reviewed, while relationships of identity or sequence between
letter s close to one another are looked for. It then quickly
becomes obvious that every third letter is an M, äs well äs the
fact that we are here dealing with a triadic sequence. The se-
•quential relation between the first two letters of every triad can
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then, indeed, be found quickly. This applies äs well to the rela-
tionship between the middle letter of every triad and the first
letter of the triad, following it. The pattern n(a)n(a)s(ß) is
then fixed. According to Simon, experience has shown that for
both strategies relatively simple Computer programs can be
constructed. The « creativity machine » would then be a reality
(cf. Loeser, 1972).
The example chosen seems very artificial and impossible to
connect to any practical example. And yet there is no qualitati-
ve difference between finding a pattern in a letter sequence and
constructing a periodic table of chemical elements äs did Men-
deleev. According to Simon, this model for the arrangement of
elements according to their atomic weight, led to a whole series
of experiments designed to test predictions derived from the
model itself.
When developing a hypothetical model concerning letter se-
quence, the induction problem does not arise because that mo-
del does not pretend to apply for other data collections or for
an expansion of the original collection. The generalization pro-
blem arises only in the second stage, thoroughly described by
Popper. But Simon's description here of discovering hypotheses
does coincide with the ever more common research practice in
which on the basis of a part of the empirical material collected,
the most suitable model is looked for. Whether or not such a
quasi-inductive but in fact systematically developed model is
tenable, is then tested, using the remainder of the material.
Restrictions of « positivistic » heuristics
The most important restriction of the procedure described
above is that no rules for collecting data can be derived from it.
The question of what kind of empirical material is of interest
in a particular stage of the development of a discipline, remains
unanswered. The choice of variables to be measured is presup-
posed (i.e. cannot be justified theoretically), so that one need
only look for a model that in all probability reflects, most
adequately, the relationships between the variables chosen, that
is the collected data. In developing a model, questions äs these
all play a role: is a linear model the best representation, or
should one allow for curvilinearity and interactions? And what
weight should be assigned to the elements in the function, etc.
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However, the starting point is a data-matrix already presuppo-
sing the selection of a number of variables from among a collec-
tion of possibly relevant variables. It is this selection in particu-
lar with which Critical Psychology has concerned itself most
intensively, and for which the functional-historical method was
developed. The notions liying at the root of this can best be il-
lustrated with an example.
Imagine that research is done on the motivation of children
to learn certain material. The research subject — motivation —
would at first glance seem to be determined by a whole series
of variables äs sex, age, socio-economic background, self-image,
the nature and structure of the material, the type of teacher,
the system of rewards and punishment, the sociometric structu-
re of the class, etc. Indeed, an enormously complex reality. The
traditional researcher will try to reduce this complexity by
limiting his experiment, for example, to two variables, in order
to keep the problem methodologically and technically resear-
chable. His « positivistic » methodology does not limit Hirn in
his choice of these (« independent ») variables. Strictly spea-
king, he need only make a bold conjecture, and subject it to
rigorous testing. The researcher takes äs it were a slice of a
complex reality and examines it, without having to worry about
a context or totality which are difficult to investigate in the
first place. A second researcher having a go at this problem, has
the same fundamental freedom in choosing a limited number of
variables to investigate. In turn, he will personally fish out two
(most likely) other very promising independent variables and
thoroughly investigate their correlation with motivation, by
means of a carefully arranged and laborious test procedure. It
would come äs no surprise at all if both researchers found sup-
port for their hypotheses concerning the determinants of the re-
search subject. The two ad hoc theories of motivation, Ti and
Tz would be formulated, both of which would be equally
« true » according to 'positivistic' criteria, at least they could
not be falsified. Ti would be based on the independent variables
(c.q. determinants) Vi and ¥2, Ta on Vs and V4. The expecta-
tion is then that reality could be reconstructed, äs it were, äs a
mosaic, simply by integrating Ti and T2. But will combining
two partial theories guarantee the creation of a theory that
describes and explains the essence of the subject?
Holzkamp does not think so. He urges that by means of
theoretical research a distinction between essential and non-es-
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sential determinants should be made in advance. For imagine
that Vi and Va are non-essential variables influencing the re-
search subject only in limited spaces and at limited times. First
of all, the results of the partial investigations having led to the
theories are not likely to appear again under somewhat diffe-
rent historical and geographical circumstances. Secondly, the
integrated final result will be subject to the same limitations.
In this case äs well the ideal of universally applicable laws
seems to be unattainable and what appeared general, turns out
to but one of the many fragmented bits of theory.
The question is, of course, why the natural sciences run up
against this kind of fragmentation so much less frequent, despi-
te the fact that there a « positivistic » approach is used äs well.
Holzkamp believes that in physics and chemistry in particular,
the research subject itself got more and more an integrating
function (that is, influenced the pattern of theory develo-
pment). This because its basic dimensions, together forming an
integrated system of fundamental properties (äs mass, force and
acceleration in classical dynamics) came increasingly to the fore-
ground. These basic dimensions would then lead to a funda-
mental system of concepts which would also determine the
Interpretation of the results of research into aspects of a pro-
blem2. In the social sciences, however, there is no consensus
over the basic structure of reality, partially because there is no
method at our disposal to analyse existing material äs to its
basic dimensions. Because of this, the 'anarchistic' cancer of
social scientific theories and hypotheses continues to spread.
'Positivistic methodology' does in fact contain formal validity
criteria for truth. Though it is true that through the falsifica-
tion principle and the verisimilitude thesis, the ideal of truth
remains unattainable, we can nonetheless get closer and closer
to it. But 'positivistic' methodology does not have any rele-
vancy criteria. Such criteria would enable to distinguish be-
tween essential and non-essential dimensions of a research su-
bject, in this case a variables model. Empirical testing is only a
necessary, but certainly not a sufficient condition in determi-
ning the scientific value of a Statement about the relationship
between variables. Testing according to relevancy criteria, i.e.
2 Holzkamp (1978, p. 147). The automatic process implied here seems to
us a somewhat too naively realistic view of the nature of the natural scientific
system of concepts, which are, after all, constructivistic (compare Kühn, 1962).
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answering the question whether a Statement relates to the basic
dimensions of the research subject, is just äs necessary. We
would then be able to avoid attributing the same importance to
every succesfully tested Statement. If we are not, choosing a
theory would become a question of taste and fashion.
It would seem that an obvious solution to the problem of
relevancy lies within the research subject itself. As we have
seen, Holzkamp believed that in the natural sciences the resear-
ch subject itself established the basic categories for research
hypotheses. In the case of the self-analyzing social scientific
research subject, « the human being », it would seem obvious
that the often implicit theories and Systems of concepts with
which participants in experiments describe and Interpret their
world, should be made the basis for pre-structuring the research
subject into essential and non-essential dimensions.
Use of such strategies has, in fact, been supported by Winch
(1970). He stated that the social sciences were not completely
free in choosing a system of concepts through which human
behavior is described. Indeed, how behavior in a social context
is interpreted by the « actor » and his public is greatly depen-
dent upon the system of rules adhered to in that context.
Whether certain behavior, or better still, a certain activity
should be interpreted, äs sport, or suicide, can differ according
to the cultural context and « language » Community. Often a
sharp distinction between suicide and a very dangerous sport
cannot simply be drawn from ethologically describing äs obje-
ctively äs possible the externally perceptible elements of a
system of behavior, resulting in a voluntary death one inflicts
upon oneself. The social sciences must therefore derive the
structure of the research subject from the framework of inter-
pretations of the « participant ».
There is, however, a fundamental problem with this and
similar approaches (cf. Glaser and Strauss, 1967). This is the
phenomenon of rationalization and of unconscious or subcon-
scious motives, which can play an important role in the seif-In-
terpretation of a participant in an experiment. This approach
assumes, in fact, an idealistic notion of people, in which the
emancipated human being is the complete master of him — or
herseif and the world. In reality, however, an « everyday »
framework of interpretations without ideological distorsions is
nearly unimaginable (Holzkamp, 1978). In the view of the
world of the participant, reality and appearance flow into one
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another, and science cannot blindly rely upon the ability of the
individual.
CRITICAL HEURISTICS: «DER DREISCHRITT »
Holzkamp believes that the solution to this undoubtedly
extremely fundamental problem of developing an adequate
System of concepts and a hypothetical model of the research
subject, can be found in the Cultural Historical School. Leon-
tiev (1973) in particular, demonstrated that only by analysis of
the historical, social and phylogenetic background of a subject
its essential traits and structures can be made discernable. The
behavior of participants in experiments in the framework of
contemporary psychological research is not only the result of
their individual development. It is also a result of the deve-
lopment of the (biological) species and of the social structures
in which the species seeks assurances for its survival and repro-
duction.
The basic dimensions of the research subject emerge when
the question arises what the function of particular behavior is
for the material process of production and reproduction of life
of the individual and the species. At the same time, the que-
stion at what social development level this process occurs must
also be investigated (Jäger, 1977). Leontiev distinguishes
three methodological steps in the functional-historical method,
all of which have been adopted by Critical Psychology:
1. Analysis of the natural historical (phylogenetic) develo-
pment seen äs the (re)production of humans äs biological or-
ganisms.
2. Analysis of the social historical development seen äs the
(re)production of the culture, that is the life of the individual
within the group.
3. Analysis of the individual (ontogenetical) development in
a particular social context and class, seen äs the (re)production
of the individual.
Three presuppositions lie at the root of the functional histo-
rical method. First, that the historical development of a phe-
nomenon has left a mark on its fundamental structure. Se-
condly, that the necessity of (re)production of the individual
and the species determines the basic dimensions of a phenome-
non. And thirdly, that this (re)production is maximalized in a
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social context, that is in the group. In short, human behavior is
characterized by its historical, material and social nature.
The assumption here is, of course, that while the question of
the function of behavior will be answered differently at each
stage of development, each stage leaves its mark on the next
stage.
The three fundamental stages of development:
1. the stage of biological phylogenesis;
2. the stage of the origin and development of life in society;
3. the stage of life in a specific (capitalistic) type of society,
do not replace each other entirely, but are bound up in each
other.
In this view, the actions and thought of a contemporary
individual are not only determined by the necessity to reprodu-
ce and contribute to the reproduction of the species in a specifi-
cally capitalistic society. They are also determined by remain-
ders of the two preceding stages, that is the stage of (re)pro-
duction of the biological organism and the stage of maximali-
zing this (re)production in the context of the group. The moti-
vation to learn a particular amount of material is therefore
not only determined by variables arising in the actual Situation
(structure of the material, kind of teacher, relationships in the
class, etc.). It is also determined by « residues » — paradoxi-
cally enough of essential importance — of times past; in parti-
cular from the time that the biological organism had to display
a certain amount of exploratory incentive in order to adjust äs
well äs possible to an ever changing environment. The impor-
tance of these remainders of natural historical phylogenesis,
stored in the 'biological inheritance' should not, however, be
overestimated. Critical Psychology attributes the 'leap' from
phylogenesis to social development to the uniquely human ca-
pacity of conscious construction and use of tools. This led to
the development of a sort of social memory — the « cultural
inheritance » in which Solutions to problems which confronted
preceding generations are stored. This extensive cultural inheri-
tance covers äs it were the biological inheritance without neu-
tralizing completely the influence of the latter.
The plough for example, is then the objectivation of one of
the Solutions man has discovered in the course of evolution for
the problem of increasing the yield in agriculture. By « Anei-
gnung », that is actively acquiring its cultural inheritance, every
generation is enabled to climb on the shoulders of the prece-
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ding generations and, by doing so, achieve a higher level of
adjustment to the environment of production and reproduction
of collective and individual life, of satisfaction of the basic
urges (compare Seve, 1975). At this level of social develo-
pment, the « social specificity level », the individual is depen-
dent on the group for maximum adjustment to the environ-
ment, and his contribution to collective production and repro-
duction is simultaneously a contribution to his own (re)pro-
duction äs an individual. In this view, the age of saying: « ho-
mo homini lupus est», the bitter struggle for (individual) exi-
stence is replaced by an almost idyllic view of harmonious
communal life in which each member is an indispensible link.
This is all the more surprising äs we are not concerned here
with a traditional 'adjustment ideology' of the individual but
with an « anthropology » based on historical materialistic prin-
ciples. But this notion is concerned with the general 'social
specificity level' and not with a specific solidifying of it in the
form of an « antagonistic class society ». This view therefore
has a « contrafactual» character, that is, it is possible but not
always — and in the case of capitalism hardly ever a reality.
Furthermore, this concept is concerned with the modal indivi-
dual and not with a unique individual. Holzkamp described this
modal individual äs follows, based upon the results of functio-
nal historical analysis: « Of all living things, only the human be-
ing has the species-specific biological capability of objectively
changing nature through cultural activities. He is therefore capa-
ble of participating individually in the cultural supervision of
the conditions of human life by actively acquiring objective, hi-
storically accumulated experience. At the same time, he therefo-
re participates in creating and improving the conditions for his
own existential security » (Holzkamp, 1978, p. 155). The es-
sential characteristics of this critical « anthropology » of the
modal individual are therefore:
a) a series of unspecified biological capabilities (biological
inheritance) for cooperatively changing nature with a view to
preserving and enriching the conditions of life of the species,
b) whereby the individual actively acquires culturally colle-
cted experiences (cultural inheritance), stored in products of
manual and cognitive work, enabling him to attain that level of
development,
c) that in maximalizing the collective condition of life he
maximalizes the individual conditions äs well.
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What is then essential from a functional-historical point of
view, is that knowledge and ability, those attitudes and needs
of the individual that firstly enable him to stay alive and
develop, and thereby contribute to the (re)production process
äs society demands. Secondly, they must also enable him to gain
control of his own life conditions by participating in society's
control of reality. Thirdly, they must also enable him, by acti-
vely acquiring society's cultural inheritance, to approach a deve-
lopmental level which the developments in society äs a whole,
make possible.
Of course, the central question arising from this functional
historical deduction of a theoretical « model » of the human
being äs subject of psychological research is to what extent the
presuppositions of the method have (entirely) determined its
results. We have seen that the historical materialistic roots of
the method consisted of principles of the historical, material
and social nature of human behavior. These principles determi-
ned the questions concerning the function of behavior. The
principle of the historical nature of behavior makes it worth-
while to dig deep into the history and phylogenesis of man
when confronted with the question of the structure of the
present day subject. It is therefore no surprise that in critical
« anthropology » the biological determination of human beha-
vior is mentioned (without further delineating what the nature
of this determination is). This applies to the principles of the
material and social nature of behavior äs well. These principles
are found in 'anthropology' only in another form. Because of
this, the journeys through man's natural and social history seem
a bit superfluous; in fact, the cards have been cut in advance.
And yet, when functional-historical analyses have been worked
out concretely, they result in drastic changes in existing conce-
ptual methods of structuring research subjects in advance. With
the aid of functional-historical analysis, Holzkamp-Osterkamp
(1975, 1976), for example, develops a totally different motiva-
tional needs structure than, for example, Maslow (based on
humanistic psychology) or Freud (based on psycho-analysis). On
the basis of ethological and biological material in particular,
Holzkamp-Osterkamp attempts to show that two kinds of
fundamental needs exist. The first are the so-called 'producti-
ve' needs, that is needs directed towards mastering the envi-
tonment, in this case the relevant, collective and individual
conditions of life. The second are the so-called 'sensual-vital'
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needs, directed towards direct satisfaction of individual needs,
for example, nourishment, sexuality, etc. Man's urge to master
bis environment is expressed in the 'productive' need, among
other things by anticipating possible future needs. For this, a
collective effort is most suitable.
For instance, protection against natural catastrophies such
äs floods, is achieved most efficiently by collective efforts in
connection with building dykes. On the other band, 'sensual-vi-
tal' needs are directed towards the present, towards the con-
sumption of social products, in part for the reproduction
(physical rehabilitation, procreation) of the individual (Holz-
kamp-Osterkamp, 1976, p. 23 ff.). While Maslow places a
'productive' need to explore the environment relatively low
in bis hierarchy, after the satisfaction of physical needs, and
Freud 'sensual-vital' needs, such äs sexual needs, at the top,
Holzkamp-Osterkamp stresses the 'productive' needs. We
will not expand on the background of and differences between
the 'needs theories' mentioned above. But it is clear that a
functional-historical analysis may have a great effect on empiri-
cal-psychological research on motivation. How great is unfortu-
nately difficult to say, äs Holzkamp-Osterkamp's motivation
theory has yet to be subjected to empirical testing.
FUNCTIONAL-HISTORICAL METHOD AND BIOPSYCHOLOGY
The functional historical method once again draws attention
to the biological contribution (not determination) to human
behavior, and in doing so, introduces a «biopsychological»
perspective into psychology. Of course, this perspective must
be placed in a specific context. Functional-historical analysis
makes clear that there are limits to human activity arising
from an organism's phylogenetic adaptation to the environment
and which are directed to increasing the chance of survival
(functional reflection). Only in the light of « biological inheri-
tance », which evolution has given each member of the species
since ages, can we understand the individual's present behavior.
The same applies to the phase of the species' more active and
collective adaptation to ever changing environmental conditions.
In this phase, in which actively acquiring (« Aneignung ») one's
cultural inheritance becomes more important than acquiring
one's biological inheritance, man acquired specific adaptation
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strategies that are also influential in present situations. Ac-
cording to functional-historical analysis, the concrete individual
forming the subject of psychological research is built around
a phylogenetically determined core or basic structure, around
which traits and characteristics arise from the socialization and
collectivization of life.
Finally, a layer o£ characteristics developed around this that
enables (re)production of the species and the individual in
a specific capitalistic society. These final characteristics are not
universal in nature but limited to a specific historical social
context. The first two kinds of characteristics mentioned, are
universal and therefore essential to a Critical Psychology, that
holds on to the (nomothetic) ideal of discovering universal
laws. In Fig. l the layered structure of the individual is shown
schematically. The objective of functional-historical analysis is
to analyze and structure the apparently inextricable mixture of
biological and cultural inheritance and characteristics bound to
a specific kind of society by means of a three-step approach
(«der Dreischritt»). This in order to determine which di-
mensions of behavior are essential and which are less or not es-
sential. The natural historical analysis step provides the charac-
teristics of the research subject that can be looked upon äs
essential general biological traits of the human organisms.
At this stage, a distinction must be made between these
general biological characteristics and those that are an expres-
sion of the socialization of the modal individual and are there-
fore universal in nature. After the most general and essential
biological and social traits have been distinguished in this way,




FIG. 1. - A functional-historical model of the concrete individual.
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In the light of this kind of advance structuring of the
research subject, systematic hypotheses can be developed and
tested in empirical research. At the same time, research results
can be adequately interpreted in the light of a System of
concepts derived in this manner. In other words, an Interpreta-
tion preserving the distinction between essential and non-essen-
tial dimensions of human functioning.
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL: THE PROBLEMS OF CONTAMINATION
AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY
The material the functional historical method is concerned
with is the «Gesamtwissenschaft» (Jäger, 1977, p. 125).
That is all the Information regarding the research subject to be
found in all relevant disciplines, such äs biology, ethology,
economy, sociology, etc. Holzkamp-Osterkamp's functional
historical analysis of the motivation concept is based largely
on ethological and biological material (compare also Schurig,
1976). Fast results of scientific research should form the base
of such analysis so that frontier research becomes possible.
A problem remains, though, that Critical Psychology does
not have criteria at its disposal to test the validity of the
material functional-historical analyses are concerned with. In
this way, the validity of the results of the analyses themselves
are thrown into doubt. As we have stated, Critical Psychology
criticized traditional research rather vehemently. Traditional re-
search could not provide valid, reliable, objective, generalizable
and relevant results, among other reasons, because of the stru-
cture of the research Situation. This was the opinion that Holz-
kamp in particular so articulately defended in his famous volu-
me of 1972. But these same research results, though partially
from different but still 'positivistic' disciplines äs ethology, and
biology, are the bases of functional-historical analysis in
constructing a theoretical model and System of concepts for the
research subject. The question then of course is whether the
shortcomings of this research material directly or indirectly
influence the functional-historical results. The method itself
does not have the means of preventing this frorn happening.
Critical äs it is of traditional scientific study, Critical Psycho-
logy should actually assume the inevitability of this kind of
negative influence. Of course, available research material is not
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accepted in functional-historical analysis at face value. Appa-
rently though, what is and is not accepted is a relatively
subjective and arbitrary business. For instance, it is not clear on
the basis of what criteria Holzkamp-Osterkamp evaluate the
work o£ the biologist-ethologist Lorenz, contested even in tradi-
tional scientific circles. This very Lorenz, with his wild specula-
tion concerning the biological determination of human agres-
sion, has repeatedly hazarded unfounded generalizations from
results of ethological research to the area of human behavior,
an area äs yet hardly explored by ethology (Lorenz, 1963).
Even prominent colleagues are vehemently opposed to such
generalizations (Hinde, 1978). And yet it is the very same
Lorenz whom Holzkamp-Osterkamp consulted extensively in
constructing her motivation theory.
Aside from the problem of 'contamination' mentioned abo-
ve, a second important problem occurs in the functional-histori-
cal method, that of « intersubjectivity ». This problem concerns
the vagueness of the method itself, which is only outlined by a
very general three-step procedure and a few presuppositions. It
would be naive to believe that any other well-intentioned
researcher could actually work with such a description. A « me-
thod » pretending intersubjectivity (we may assume that fun-
ctional-historical analyses are not made in such a way äs to be
unmatchable) will at least have to make explicit what kind of
strainer is used in evaluating the usefulness of results available
from the «Gesamtwissenschaft ». As things stand now, the
functional historical method is not « learnable » and the results
of the analysis are not testable on grounds of the way in which
they have been brought about, simply because crucial criteria
have not been made explicit. For the time being, the method
must therefore be considered elitist and esoteric, that is useful
only to a small number of insiders.
CONCLUSION
With the aid of the functional-historical method, Critical
Psychology attempted to help find a solution to a fundamental
problem in traditional scientific studies: the swell of ad hoc
theories and hypotheses resulting from the methodologically
sanctioned anarchy in the context of discovery. On the basis of
this contribution, it is understandable why Holzkamp did not
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wish to call Critical Psychology a separate school among the
current schools within psychology. Has Critical Psychology suc-
ceeded in filling the undeniable gap in theory and concept
development within Traditional Psychology, and thereby made
the functional-historical method indispensable to every psycho-
logy researcher? That question can only be answered when the
Problems of 'contamination' and 'intersubjectivity' have been
solved. Critical Psychology does not have criteria at its disposal
to test the validity of the material functional-historical analyses
are concerned with (the problem of contamination). The me-
thod itself is only outlined by a very general three-steps proce-
dure and is therefore not learnable (the problem of intersu-
bjectivity).
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Summary - In the sixties and seventies, a critical psychological school deve-
loped around Klaus Holzkamp in West Berlin. This school criticized 'tra-
ditional' psychology, especially in the area of theory development. 'Traditio-
nal' psychology has not developed a methodology of the discovery context and
leaves the induction of hypotheses and theoretical models of empirical research
to coincidence. The result is a hodge-podge of disconnected research results.
The connection between empirical results and the broader historical cultural
context also remains unclear. Klaus Holzkamp's Critical Psychology believes
to have corrected this defect with its functional-historical method. This theo-
retical research method is derived from the work of the Soviet Russian Cultural
Historical School, and in particular from publications of Leontiev. There are
three Steps in the functional-historical method — the phylogenetic analysis, the
cultural historical analysis and finally the ontogenetical analysis. The three stages
of analysis result in a tentative theoretical tnodel and a system of concepts with
which further empirical research can be conducted. The functional historical
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method guarantees empirical research results which are coherent, and histo-
rically and socially relevant. There are, however, a number of problems with
this method. First of all, it is not clear what concrete criteria are applied in
screening the phylogenetic and historical research material from which the
theoretical model is constructed (the so-called contamination problem). In
addition, the method demands a great deal from the researcher, who must be
at home with the « Gesamtwissenschaft», that is with all relevant interdisci-
plinary scientific research results. Here there is the danger of an esoteric and
elitist approach, äs critical äs its intentions may be (the so-called intersubjecti-
vity problem). Finally, we point to the fact that there is no proof of this
pudding. The Berlin Critical Psychology has äs yet too little empirical research
experience to demonstrate the fruitfulness of the functional historical method.
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